Peter Dale Scott – The Modus Operandi of the Bomb
It has been widely noted that Breivik in 7/22 used the same bombing modus operandi as Oklahoma City and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing – an ammonium nitrate bomb concealed in a parked vehicle. As Andrew Gumbel wrote in an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times, Breivik appears to have been more than simply inspired by American predecessors such as Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber: The materials he used, the way he planned and carried out his attacks, and his own writings all suggest he was deeply familiar with the actions of some notorious political killers on this side of the Atlantic.
Breivik possessed a Glock semiautomatic, the same weapon McVeigh was carrying when he was arrested by a hawk-eyed Highway Patrol officer 90 minutes after the April 1995 bombing in Oklahoma. Breivik also possessed a .223-caliber Ruger assault rifle, just like McVeigh.23
Oklahoma City bombing
The debate still continues whether Breivik himself could have developed the skills to make a successful ammonium nitrate bomb. But there are strong indications that the 1993 WTC bombers and one of the two known 1995 Oklahoma City bombers (Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols) received training from abroad, possibly from al Qaeda.
In the words of Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Nichols’ skill as a terrorist seems to have grown while in the Philippines. Initially he was an unsuccessful bomb-maker. According to Michael Fortier’s testimony, Nichols and McVeigh failed miserably when they tested an explosive device in the Arizona desert just six months before they bombed the Murrah building. After Nichols’ final trip to the Philippines, he and McVeigh were fully capable of manufacturing the crude but deadly bomb that was used to bring down the Murrah federal building.24
Rohrabacher also explored the apparent connections in the Philippines between Nichols and Ramzi Yousef, the al-Qaeda-linked mastermind of the 1993 WTC bombing. (Yousef is a close associate and relative of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, said to have been the mastermind of al Qaeda’s 9/11 exploit.)25 According to researcher J.M. Berger and others, “In November 1994, Terry Nichols and Ramzi Yousef both walked on the grounds of the same college campus,” Southwestern University in the Philippine city of Cebu, where an Islamist cell was active. Later, each man booked a flight on the same airline.26
It is worth recalling that in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center the attackers were trained by a member of al Qaeda, Ali Mohamed, who almost certainly was a double agent working also for U.S. sources. The same trainer “led” (to quote the 9/11 Commission Report” the 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassy, and may have trained the alleged 9/11 hijackers as well.27
This continuity suggests that all these American incidents of violence may have been part of an on-going strategy of tension, to destabilize society as a means to justify the ever-mounting budgets for America’s security forces. In American War Machine I devoted an entire chapter to the question whether we should see 9/11 as part of an on-going tradition of “engineered” deep events. (I took the term “engineered” from a U.S. army document stating, “The engineering of a series of provocations to justify military intervention is feasible and could be accomplished with the resources available.”)28
The fact that Breivik imitated McVeigh does not prove that they were part of the same organization. It is possible that Breivik consciously imitated McVeigh, as a way of heightening and shading the aura of mystery he cultivated around his actions – or if you will as a kind of hommage to McVeigh, along with the Unabomber and others I shall name shortly. But I shall argue that Breivik may indeed have been intimate with the arms-for-drugs milieu that can also be perceived in the background of both Oklahoma City and al Qaeda. (For al Qaeda, despite the odd denial in the 9/11 Commission Report, was almost certainly a drug-trafficking and drug-supported organization.)29
Breivik’s Finances Suggest He Did Not Act Alone
Breivik’s planted clues about his finances also point mysteriously to international connections beyond what was needed for 7/22 alone. In this case the mystery of his finances is reinforced by evidence we learn independently from the Norwegian police: namely, that in 2007, a year in which he reported little taxable income, the equivalent of $115,000 was mysteriously deposited into Breivik’s bank account.30 This important clue, not coming from Breivik himself, refers to a time when „Government records suggest that …. his early attempts at business were a failure.“31
Breivik himself has reportedly heightened the mystery behind the alleged “loner.” He is said to have explained to the police that he had ten times as much money (six million kroner, about $1.1 million) to finance his terrorist attacks.32 His lawyer, Geir Lippestad, has added that his planning also involved extensive travel:
„[Breivik] has traveled in many countries in Europe, via car, ferry and plane, said Lippestad. These states correspond to some of those states mentioned in Breivik’s so-called manifesto, which he repeatedly mentioned during the interrogations. According to Lippestad, [Breivik’s] traveling has been directly related to the planning of the attacks, which was most intense in recent years. He has met with an unknown number of people who have helped him to obtain materials, and he also explained that most of the equipment is from abroad. In earlier questioning, Breivik explained that he had six million [kroner] to finance the terrorist attacks.33
An even more suggestive lead to this hidden financial dimension is a statement attached to the Breivik manifesto, in which “Breivik” claimed to describe his irregular commercial and banking activity:
2005-2007: Managing director of E-Commerce Group AS (part investment company – 50%, part sales/outsourcing company – 50%). I converted ABB ENK to a corporation (AS). Total of 7 employees: 3 in Norway, 1 in Russia, 1 in Indonesia, 1 in Romania, 1 in the US. Distribution of outsourcing services to foreign companies, sold software/programming solutions. Worked part time with day trading (stocks/options/currency/commodities).
This was a front (milking cow) with the purpose of financing resistance/liberation related military operations. The company was successful although most of the funds were channelled through a Caribbean subsidiary (with base in Antigua, a location where European countries do not have access): Brentwood Solutions Limited with bank accounts in other Caribbean nations and Eastern Europe. E-Commerce Group was terminated in 2007 while most of the funds were channelled in an “unorthodox manner” to Norway available to the coming intellectual and subsequent operations phase.34
Antigua, a small island in the Caribbean, was noted for its corrupt banks with intelligence connections; it was used for example by BCCI and Israeli operatives in the 1980s for illicit arms sales to the Medellin cocaine cartel.35 Some have seen a possible implication of Israel in this allusion to Antigua by Breivik, an avowed pro-Zionist in his manifesto. The same people have pointed to an article by Barry Rubin in the July 31 Jerusalem Post, claiming that the Utoya youth camp that Breivik attacked (and which had been rehearsing ways to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza) was “engaged in what was essentially … a pro-terrorist program.”36
Finally some have pointed to the growing links between the right-wing parties of Israel and formerly anti-Semitic right-wing parties extolled in the Breivik manifesto.37
In this article I am arguing neither for nor against the possible involvement of Israelis, along with others, in the events of 7/22. I will however argue that we should look for an ultimate source, not in the covert structures of any single state, but in a paranational dark force with the capacity to collude with or even manipulate them.
Norway’s Terror as Systemic Destabilization: Breivik, the Arms-for-Drugs Milieu, and Global Shadow Elites. Part II
Norway’s Terror as Systemic Destabilization: Breivik, the Arms-for-Drugs Milieu, and Global Shadow Elites. Part I
Part I: History and the Political Requirements of the Global Drug Traffic
Part II: The Meta-Group, West, and East
Part III: The Meta-Group, BCCI, and Adnan Khashoggi
Part IV: Dunlop’s Account of the Beaulieu Meeting’s Purpose: The “Russian 9/11” in 1999
Part V: Dunlop’s Redactions of His Source Yasenev
Part VI: The Khashoggi Villa Meeting, Kosovo, and the “Pristina Dash”
Part VII: The Role of Anton Surikov: The Dunlop and Yasenev Versions
Part VIII: Saidov, Surikov, Muslim Insurrectionism, and Drug Trafficking
Part IX: Allegations of Drug-Trafficking and Far West Ltd.
Part X: Far West Ltd, Halliburton, Diligence LLC, New Bridge, and Neil Bush
Part XI: The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic.
Last Part XII: Concluding Remarks: Meta-Groups and Transpolitics.
Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat and English Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, is a poet, writer, and researcher.