Peter Dale Scott – The Modus Operandi of the Bomb
It has been widely noted that Breivik in 7/22 used the same bombing modus operandi as Oklahoma City and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing – an ammonium nitrate bomb concealed in a parked vehicle. As Andrew Gumbel wrote in an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times, Breivik appears to have been more than simply inspired by American predecessors such as Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber: The materials he used, the way he planned and carried out his attacks, and his own writings all suggest he was deeply familiar with the actions of some notorious political killers on this side of the Atlantic.

Breivik possessed a Glock semiautomatic, the same weapon McVeigh was carrying when he was arrested by a hawk-eyed Highway Patrol officer 90 minutes after the April 1995 bombing in Oklahoma. Breivik also possessed a .223-caliber Ruger assault rifle, just like McVeigh.23

Oklahoma City bombing
The debate still continues whether Breivik himself could have developed the skills to make a successful ammonium nitrate bomb. But there are strong indications that the 1993 WTC bombers and one of the two known 1995 Oklahoma City bombers (Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols) received training from abroad, possibly from al Qaeda.

In the words of Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Nichols’ skill as a terrorist seems to have grown while in the Philippines. Initially he was an unsuccessful bomb-maker. According to Michael Fortier’s testimony, Nichols and McVeigh failed miserably when they tested an explosive device in the Arizona desert just six months before they bombed the Murrah building. After Nichols’ final trip to the Philippines, he and McVeigh were fully capable of manufacturing the crude but deadly bomb that was used to bring down the Murrah federal building.24

Rohrabacher also explored the apparent connections in the Philippines between Nichols and Ramzi Yousef, the al-Qaeda-linked mastermind of the 1993 WTC bombing. (Yousef is a close associate and relative of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, said to have been the mastermind of al Qaeda’s 9/11 exploit.)25 According to researcher J.M. Berger and others, “In November 1994, Terry Nichols and Ramzi Yousef both walked on the grounds of the same college campus,” Southwestern University in the Philippine city of Cebu, where an Islamist cell was active. Later, each man booked a flight on the same airline.26

It is worth recalling that in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center the attackers were trained by a member of al Qaeda, Ali Mohamed, who almost certainly was a double agent working also for U.S. sources. The same trainer “led” (to quote the 9/11 Commission Report” the 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassy, and may have trained the alleged 9/11 hijackers as well.27

This continuity suggests that all these American incidents of violence may have been part of an on-going strategy of tension, to destabilize society as a means to justify the ever-mounting budgets for America’s security forces. In American War Machine I devoted an entire chapter to the question whether we should see 9/11 as part of an on-going tradition of “engineered” deep events. (I took the term “engineered” from a U.S. army document stating, “The engineering of a series of provocations to justify military intervention is feasible and could be accomplished with the resources available.”)28

The fact that Breivik imitated McVeigh does not prove that they were part of the same organization. It is possible that Breivik consciously imitated McVeigh, as a way of heightening and shading the aura of mystery he cultivated around his actions – or if you will as a kind of hommage to McVeigh, along with the Unabomber and others I shall name shortly. But I shall argue that Breivik may indeed have been intimate with the arms-for-drugs milieu that can also be perceived in the background of both Oklahoma City and al Qaeda. (For al Qaeda, despite the odd denial in the 9/11 Commission Report, was almost certainly a drug-trafficking and drug-supported organization.)29

Breivik’s Finances Suggest He Did Not Act Alone
Breivik’s planted clues about his finances also point mysteriously to international connections beyond what was needed for 7/22 alone. In this case the mystery of his finances is reinforced by evidence we learn independently from the Norwegian police: namely, that in 2007, a year in which he reported little taxable income, the equivalent of $115,000 was mysteriously deposited into Breivik’s bank account.30 This important clue, not coming from Breivik himself, refers to a time when „Government records suggest that …. his early attempts at business were a failure.“31

Breivik himself has reportedly heightened the mystery behind the alleged “loner.” He is said to have explained to the police that he had ten times as much money (six million kroner, about $1.1 million) to finance his terrorist attacks.32 His lawyer, Geir Lippestad, has added that his planning also involved extensive travel:

„[Breivik] has traveled in many countries in Europe, via car, ferry and plane, said Lippestad. These states correspond to some of those states mentioned in Breivik’s so-called manifesto, which he repeatedly mentioned during the interrogations. According to Lippestad, [Breivik’s] traveling has been directly related to the planning of the attacks, which was most intense in recent years. He has met with an unknown number of people who have helped him to obtain materials, and he also explained that most of the equipment is from abroad. In earlier questioning, Breivik explained that he had six million [kroner] to finance the terrorist attacks.33

An even more suggestive lead to this hidden financial dimension is a statement attached to the Breivik manifesto, in which “Breivik” claimed to describe his irregular commercial and banking activity:
2005-2007: Managing director of E-Commerce Group AS (part investment company – 50%, part sales/outsourcing company – 50%). I converted ABB ENK to a corporation (AS). Total of 7 employees: 3 in Norway, 1 in Russia, 1 in Indonesia, 1 in Romania, 1 in the US. Distribution of outsourcing services to foreign companies, sold software/programming solutions. Worked part time with day trading (stocks/options/currency/commodities).

This was a front (milking cow) with the purpose of financing resistance/liberation related military operations. The company was successful although most of the funds were channelled through a Caribbean subsidiary (with base in Antigua, a location where European countries do not have access): Brentwood Solutions Limited with bank accounts in other Caribbean nations and Eastern Europe. E-Commerce Group was terminated in 2007 while most of the funds were channelled in an “unorthodox manner” to Norway available to the coming intellectual and subsequent operations phase.34

Antigua, a small island in the Caribbean, was noted for its corrupt banks with intelligence connections; it was used for example by BCCI and Israeli operatives in the 1980s for illicit arms sales to the Medellin cocaine cartel.35 Some have seen a possible implication of Israel in this allusion to Antigua by Breivik, an avowed pro-Zionist in his manifesto. The same people have pointed to an article by Barry Rubin in the July 31 Jerusalem Post, claiming that the Utoya youth camp that Breivik attacked (and which had been rehearsing ways to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza) was “engaged in what was essentially … a pro-terrorist program.”36

Finally some have pointed to the growing links between the right-wing parties of Israel and formerly anti-Semitic right-wing parties extolled in the Breivik manifesto.37

In this article I am arguing neither for nor against the possible involvement of Israelis, along with others, in the events of 7/22. I will however argue that we should look for an ultimate source, not in the covert structures of any single state, but in a paranational dark force with the capacity to collude with or even manipulate them.

Norway’s Terror as Systemic Destabilization: Breivik, the Arms-for-Drugs Milieu, and Global Shadow Elites. Part II
Norway’s Terror as Systemic Destabilization: Breivik, the Arms-for-Drugs Milieu, and Global Shadow Elites. Part I

Further reading:

Part I: History and the Political Requirements of the Global Drug Traffic
Part II: The Meta-Group, West, and East

Part III: The Meta-Group, BCCI, and Adnan Khashoggi
Part IV: Dunlop’s Account of the Beaulieu Meeting’s Purpose: The “Russian 9/11” in 1999
Part V: Dunlop’s Redactions of His Source Yasenev
Part VI: The Khashoggi Villa Meeting, Kosovo, and the “Pristina Dash”

Part VII: The Role of Anton Surikov: The Dunlop and Yasenev Versions
Part VIII: Saidov, Surikov, Muslim Insurrectionism, and Drug Trafficking

Part IX: Allegations of Drug-Trafficking and Far West Ltd.
Part X: Far West Ltd, Halliburton, Diligence LLC, New Bridge, and Neil Bush
Part XI: The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic.

Last Part XII: Concluding Remarks: Meta-Groups and Transpolitics.

Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat and English Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, is a poet, writer, and researcher.

Daya Gamage – Asian Tribune Foreign News Desk – A U.S. diplomatic cable made public by WikiLeaks provides evidence that U.S. troops executed at least 10 Iraqi civilians, including a woman in her 70s and a 5-month-old infant, then called in an airstrike to destroy the evidence, during a controversial 2006 incident in the central Iraqi town of Ishaqi.

The unclassified cable, which was posted on WikiLeaks‘ website last week, contained questions from a United Nations investigator about the incident, which had angered local Iraqi officials, who demanded some kind of action from their government. U.S. officials denied at the time that anything inappropriate had occurred.

The U.S. diplomatic cable containing the communication by Philip Alston, the U.N.’s special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions to American officials dated 12 days after the March 15, 2006 incident was disclosed by McClatchy Newspapers. This was one of the thousands of US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks last week.

Philip Alston in his communication with the American officials said incident that autopsies performed in the Iraqi city of Tikrit showed that all the dead had been handcuffed and shot in the head. Among the dead were four women and five children. The children were all 5 years old or younger.

Alston initially posed his questions to the U.S. Embassy in Geneva, which passed them to Washington in the cable.

When contacted by the McClatchy Newspapers Alston said that as of 2010 — the most recent data he had — U.S. officials hadn’t responded to his request for information and that Iraq’s government also hadn’t been forthcoming. He said the lack of response from the United States „was the case with most of the letters to the U.S. in the 2006-2007 period,“ when fighting in Iraq peaked.

Alston said he could provide no further information on the incident. „The tragedy,“ he said, „is that this elaborate system of communications is in place but the (U.N.) Human Rights Council does nothing to follow up when states ignore issues raised with them.“

At the time, McClatchy Newspapers report added, that American military officials in Iraq said the accounts of townspeople who witnessed the events were highly unlikely to be true, and they later said the incident didn’t warrant further investigation. Military officials also refused to reveal which units might have been involved in the incident.

Ishaqi, about 80 miles northwest of Baghdad, not far from Saddam Hussein’s hometown, Tikrit, was considered so dangerous at the time that U.S. military officials had classified all roads in the area as „black,“ meaning they were likely to be booby-trapped with roadside bombs.

The Ishaqi incident was unusual because it was brought to the world’s attention by the Joint Coordination Center in Tikrit, a regional security center set up with American military assistance and staffed by U.S.-trained Iraqi police officers.

The original incident report was signed by an Iraqi police colonel and made even more noteworthy because U.S.-trained Iraqi police, including Brig. Gen. Issa al Juboori, who led the coordination center, were willing to speak about the investigation on the record even though it was critical of American forces, the McClatchy further noted in its report published in its web site 31 August.
Throughout the early investigation, U.S. military spokesmen said that an al Qaida in Iraq suspect had been seized from a first-floor room after a fierce fight that had left the house he was hiding in a pile of rubble.

But the diplomatic cable provides a different sequence of events and lends credence to townspeople’s claims that American forces destroyed the house after its residents had been shot.

According to the UN human rights official Alston’s version of events, American troops approached a house in Ishaqi, which Alston refers to as „Al-Iss Haqi,“ that belonged to Faiz Harrat Al-Majma’ee, whom Alston identified as a farmer. The U.S. troops were met with gunfire, Alston said, that lasted about 25 minutes.
After the firefight ended, Alston wrote, the „troops entered the house, handcuffed all residents and executed all of them. After the initial MNF intervention, a U.S. air raid ensued that destroyed the house.“ The initials refer to the official name of the military coalition, the Multi-National Force.

Alston said „Iraqi TV stations broadcast from the scene and showed bodies of the victims (i.e. five children and four women) in the morgue of Tikrit. Autopsies carries (sic) out at the Tikrit Hospital’s morgue revealed that all corpses were shot in the head and handcuffed.“

The cable makes no mention any of the alleged shooting suspects being found or arrested at or near the house.

The cable closely tracks what neighbors told reporters. Those neighbors said the U.S. troops had approached the house at 2:30 a.m. and a firefight ensued. In addition to exchanging gunfire with someone in the house, the American troops were supported by helicopter gunships, which fired on the house.

The cable also backs the original report from the Joint Coordination Center, which said U.S. forces entered the house while it was still standing. That first report noted: „The American forces gathered the family members in one room and executed 11 persons, including five children, four women and two men. Then they bombed the house, burned three vehicles and killed their animals.“

The report was signed by Col. Fadhil Muhammed Khalaf, who was described in the document as the assistant chief of the Joint Coordination Center.

The cable also backs up the claims of the doctor who performed the autopsies, who told Knight Ridder „that all the victims had bullet shots in the head and all bodies were handcuffed.“

The cable notes that „at least 10 persons, namely Mr. Faiz Hratt Khalaf, (aged 28), his wife Sumay’ya Abdul Razzaq Khuther (aged 24), their three children Hawra’a (aged 5) Aisha (aged 3) and Husam (5 months old), Faiz’s mother Ms. Turkiya Majeed Ali (aged 74), Faiz’s sister (name unknown), Faiz’s nieces Asma’a Yousif Ma’arouf (aged 5 years old), and Usama Yousif Ma’arouf (aged 3 years), and a visiting relative Ms. Iqtisad Hameed Mehdi (aged 23) were killed during the raid.“

Onlineredaktion – Die Aufständischen haben bei ihrem Vormarsch auf Tripolis erneut Erfolge verzeichnen können. Sie eroberten einen Stützpunkt der Chamis-Brigade, einer Eliteeinheit der Truppen von Machthaber Muammar al-Gaddafi. Die an der Strasse nach Sawija gelegene Kaserne, rund 25 Kilometer vor Tripolis, galt als schwierigste Hürde auf dem Weg in die Hauptstadt.

Nach heftigen Gefechten konnten zudem dutzende Häftlinge aus dem Gefängnis in Maja befreit werden. Hier waren Gaddafi-Gegner inhaftiert und gefoltert worden. Viele der Häftlinge sahen blass und abgemagert aus.

Dr. Alexander von Paleske 19.8. 2011
Am 11.1. 1988 explodierte hier in Bulawayo eine Autobombe vor einem Wohnhaus im Stadteil Trenance Das Haus gehörte dem Orthopäden Kenneth Rankin, aber er wohnte nicht dort, sondern in dem Haus waren exilierte Mitglieder des von der südafrikanischen Apartheidregierung verbotenen afrikanischen Nationalkongress, ANC, untergebracht, der heutigen Regierungspartei Südafrikas.

Der Bombenanschlag ging auf das Konto des südafrikanischen Geheimdienstes (Project Barnacle, Vorläufer der Todesschwadron Civil Cooperation Bureau)..

Arzt und Gegner des Apartheidregimes
Kenneth Rankin, oder Ken wie wir ihn nannten, war Gegner des Apartheidregimes. Seine aus Südafrika stammende schwarze Frau Joyce hatte mehrere Jahre wegen ihrer Aktivitäten für den ANC im Gefängnis und in der Verbannung verbracht. Nun leitete Ken die orthopädische Abteilung am Mpilo-Hospital in Bulawayo , der zweitgrößten Stadt Simbabwes, meiner damaligen und jetzigen Arbeitsstelle.

Kenneth Rankin

Ken Rankin war der einzige voll ausgebildete Orthopäde für ein Einzugsgebiet von 3 Millionen Menschen.
Er war ein hoch engagierter und hervorragender Orthopäde, der seine Aufgabe nicht nur in einer umfassenden Patientenversorgung sah, sondern gerade auch in der Aus- und Weiterbildung des medizinischen Nachwuchses.
Und er hatte bereits einen nicht minder interessanten Lebensweg hinter sich gebracht, als er seine Tätigkeit in Simbabwe aufnahm.

Jenseits von Afrika
Geboren in Ägypten im Jahr 1939, sein Vater war Offizier in der Royal Air Force, kam Kenneth Rankin mit seinen Eltern 1942 nach England.
An den Schulbesuch schloss sich das Medizinstudium in Schottland an, das er 1963 in Edinburgh abschloss.

Zurück nach Afrika
Es folgten Jahre als Assistenzarzt und Schiffsarzt, bis er 1967 nach Südafrika kam, um dort seine Weiterbildung in Orthopädie fortzusetzen.

Sein Interesse galt nicht der akademischen Karriere, er hatte auch keine finanziellen Erwartungen, sondern wollte dort helfen, „wo Not am Mann war“.
So begann er seine Arbeit n einem Landkrankenhaus in der Limpopo-Provinz, im Norden Südafrikas.

Sein weiterer Lebensweg führte ihn in das Baragwanath Hospital im Soweto-Township von Johannesburg, das grösste Hospital für die schwarze Bevölkerung im Apartheid Südafrika, heute das grösste Hospital der Welt mit über 3000 Betten.

Regelmässig machte er Outreach-Work in den ärmsten Bezirken der Provinz Kwa Zulu-Natal, dort, wo zwangsumgesiedelte Schwarze in sogenannten „Homelands“ ihr Leben fristeten und die Gesundheitsversorgung nur als miserabel bezeichnet werden konnte.Unterstützung für seine Arbeit erhielt er vom südafrikanischen Council of Churches.

Dort lernte er seine spätere Frau, die Journalistin und Anti-Apartheid Aktivistin Joyce Sikakane kennen und verliebte sich in sie. Beide verlobten sich heimlich, eine Heirat war wegen der Apartheidbestimmungen Südafrikas dort nicht möglich.
Sie beschlossen 1969 daher, Südafrika zu verlassen, und ausserhalb Südafrikas zu heiraten und zu leben.

Der lange Weg zur Ehe
Daraus wurde erst einmal nichts, denn Joyce wurde verhaftet und wegen ihrer Anti-Apartheidaktivitäten zu einer mehrjährigen Gefängnisstrafe verurteilt (Trial of the 22).

Nach ihrer Entlassung aus dem Gefängnis im Jahre 1973 verliess Joyce Südafrika und ging nach Sambia. Dort traf sie Ken wieder, der seit 1971 am University Teaching Hospital in der Hauptstadt Lusaka als Orthopäde und Dozent arbeitete, nachdem er seine Facharztweiterbildung erfolgreich in Edinburgh /Schottland abgeschlossen hatte.

Nach ihrer Heirat zog die Familie 1975 nach Schottland um, wo Ken Rankin als Consultant und Lecturer arbeite.

Erneute Rückkehr nach Afrika
1980 kehrte Ken mit Familie nach Afrika zurück, zunächst nach Mozambique, einem Land, das damals, 5 Jahre nach der Unabhängigkeit von Portugal, sich in einem von Südafrika angezettelten Bürgerkrieg befand.

In der Hauptstadt Maputo arbeitete und unterrichtete er in seinem Fach, und wechselte 1982 nach Bulawayo / Simbabwe,ein Land, das zwei Jahre zuvor unabhängig geworden war.

Hier traf ich Ken Rankin, nach Aufnahme meiner Arbeit als Hämatologe 1987, und war beeindruckt von seinem Enthusiasmus, seiner Fachkompetenz, aber auch von seiner Unbeugsamkeit.

Ken, der den Pilotenschein besass, flog auch regelmässig zu den Provinzkrankenhäusern in Masvingo und Gweru zur Patientenversorgung und Weiterbildung der dort tätigen Ärzte.

Ich hatte ihn bereits in zwei Artikeln im Zusammenhang mit einer Foto-Dokumentation erwähnt, welche die Verbrechen der 5. simbabweschen Brigade im Zusammenhang mit den Massakern im Matabeleland Anfang der 80er Jahre nach der Unabhängigkeit Simbabwes darstellte. Die Fotos zeigten die schweren Verletzungen, mit denen Patienten zu ihm zur Behandlung kamen.

Die Dokumentation schickte er direkt an Robert Mugabe, damals Premier und heute Staatspräsident.

Die Genozid ging weiter, Ken bekam Besuch vom Geheimdienst. Er entging nur knapp einer Verhaftung.

Da Ken seine fünf Kinder während des Studiums finanziell unterstützen musste, arbeitete er wieder ab 1991 als Consultant in Schottland , kehrte aber 1996 nach Afrika zurück, diesmal in das nunmehr demokratische Südafrika.

Dort arbeitete als Professor an der Universität von Pretoria im Kalafong-Hospital, seine Frau wurde Unterstaatssekretärin im Kabinett Nelson Mandelas.
Unermüdlich kümmerte er sich um die Patientenversorgung und um die Weiterbildung der jungen Ärzte. Regelmässige Besuche der Provinzkrankenhäuser waren für ihn selbstverständlich.

Nach seiner Emeritierung arbeite er konsultativ weiter in der Provinz und kehrte schliesslich 2009 nach Schottland zurück.

Im Jahre 2003 wurde er von der britischen Königin für seine Verdienste um die Verbesserung der orthopädischen Krankenversorgung in Afrika mit einem OBE, vergleichbar dem Bundesverdienstkreuz geehrt.

Dieses Jahr wollte ich während einer Reise nach Grossbritannien ein Interview mit ihm machen, das noch einmal seinen beeindruckenden Lebensweg aus seiner Sicht darstellen sollte. Aus dem geplanten Interview wurde jetzt ein Nachruf.

Kenneth Rankin starb am 3. Juli 2011 an Leukämie.

Die Afrikaner nennen sie Ma Khumalo – Besuch bei einer außergewöhnlichen Ärztin
Dr. Maria Eder – Nachruf auf eine außergewöhnliche Ärztin

Simbabwe: Mugabes Umzug ins Paradies
30 Jahre Simbabwe, 30 Jahre Robert Mugabe

Mehr aus Afrika
Afrikanische Lebensreise – Erinnerungen einer Auswanderin wider Willen

Mittlerweile zum sechsten Mal fand das Europäische Symposium für „Nicht-tödliche“ Waffen (non-lethal weapons) in Ettlingen bei Karlsruhe statt. Vom 16.-18. Mai 2011 trafen sich dazu WaffenentwicklerInnen, RüstungsvertreterInnen, PolitikerInnen, PolizeivertreterInnen und WissenschaftlerInnen aus aller Welt. Diese Konferenz zählt zu der wichtigsten Veranstaltung im Bereich „Nicht-tödliche“ Waffen und wird zunehmend bedeutender für die Bereiche Militär und Sicherheit. Wir wollen mit diesem Artikel neben allgemeinen Informationen einen kritischen Rückblick auf das Geschehene werfen und eine zukünftige Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Thematik ermöglichen.

Allgemeines zu diesen Waffen:
Bei sozialen Protesten bekannt und häufig eingesetzt werden Wasserwerfer, Tränengas oder Pfefferspray, die alle zu den sogenannten „nicht-tödlichen“ Waffen zugeordnet werden. Andererseits wurden aber auch unzählige weitere Waffen(-systeme) entwickelt, die „nicht-tödlich“ wirken sollen. Dazu zählen beispielsweise Mikrowellenstrahlenwaffen oder (Elektroschock-)Taser, Blendgranaten, Infra-/Ultraschallwaffen, Geruchsstoffe oder materialzersetzende Mikroorganismen.

Unter der Begriffsbezeichnung „Nicht-tödliche“ Waffen bzw. „schonende Zwangs- und Wirkungsmittel“ werden von ihren VertreterInnen Waffen verstanden, deren primäres Ziel nicht das Töten sein soll, sondern welche Personen handlungsunfähig machen sollen bzw. unter Kontrolle gebracht werden sollen.
Aber die Realität sind anders aus: Hunderte Menschen sind schon aufgrund des Einsatzes dieser Waffen gestorben und weitaus mehr verletzt worden[1]. Dennoch halten die VertreterInnen dieser Waffen an der Begriffsbezeichnung fest. Unserer Ansicht nach ist der Begriff „Nicht-tödliche“ Waffen grob irreführend.
In kritischen Publikationen wird der Begriff „weniger-tödliche“ Waffen (less-lethal weapons) verwendet. Wir übernehmen im Folgenden vorerst den Begriff „less-lethal weapons“ (kurz LLW). Jedoch besteht auch bei diesem Begriff noch kritischer Diskussionsbedarf.

Die Konferenz in Ettlingen:
Im Folgenden sollen zuerst die Themen der Konferenz angesprochen werden. Danach werden die handelnden Akteure und ihre Motive beleuchtet.
Die Konferenz ist laut Veranstalter „das größte europäische Symposium auf dem NLW-Sektor“. Sie dient als Plattform um momentane und geplante technologische Entwicklungen auf dem LLW-Sektor vorzustellen und zu diskutieren. Weitere Themengebiete sind u.a. medizinische und rechtliche Gesichtspunkte sowie der Gebrauch und taktische Einsatz der LLW vor dem Hintergrund wachsender neuer Bedrohungen (Aufstandsbekämpfung, Kontrolle von Menschenmassen, „friedensschaffende Militäreinsätze“). Auf diese Weise soll, laut Veranstalter ein interdisziplinäres und umfassendes Verständnis des Themenkomplexes LLW bei den TeilnehmerInnen erreicht werden. Letztlich geht es jedoch vor allem darum, eine größere Akzeptanz für LLW bei wichtigen nationalen und internationalen Instanzen zu schaffen (NATO, EU, staatliche Verteidigungsministerien).
Hinter der Konferenz steht die „Europäische Arbeitsgruppe für Nicht-tödliche Waffen“ (EWG-NLW). Dieser Ausschuss fungiert nicht nur als Programm-Kommittee und Organisator während des Symposiums, sondern befasst sich auch dauerhaft mit dem Gebiet der weniger-tödlichen Waffen. Gegründet wurde die EWG-NLW 1998 vom Fraunhofer ITC Pfinztal, die Geschäftsstelle sowie der Vorsitz liegen ebenfalls beim ITC. Der Zusammenschluss von VertreterInnen der Sicherheits- und Rüstungsindustrie, WissenschaftlerInnen und VerteidigungsministerInnen aus verschiedenen europäischen Staaten widmet sich nicht nur der Forschungs- und Vernetzungsarbeit, sondern wirbt offen für weniger-tödliche Waffen und deren Einsatz, auch auf höchsten Ebenen: Die EWG-NLW berät und unterstützt Regierungen, arbeitet innerhalb von NATO-Gremien und wirkt bei Entscheidungsprozessen der Europäischen Union (EU) mit. Damit hat die EWG-NLW nicht nur einen nicht zu unterschätzenden Einfluss auf die Forschungsausgaben im Sicherheitsbereich, sondern trägt zur aktiven Verbreitung und der Akzeptanz von weniger-tödlichen Waffen bei.

Ziele und Inhalte der Konferenz 2011:
Wenn man Absichten und Ziele des Veranstalters durch das Symposium 2011 betrachtet und diese mit den vergangenen Konferenzen vergleicht, ist eine neue Ausrichtung erkennbar: In den ersten Jahren der Konferenz wurde der Erkenntnisgewinn und die Zusammenführung verschiedener Aspekte (Technik, Medizin, Recht, Taktik) als wichtiges Ziel der Konferenz definiert. Damals ebenfalls vorhandene Interessen der Verbreitung von weniger-tödlichen Waffen wurden nicht explizit kommuniziert. Vielmehr wurden teilweise auch Diskussionen über technische Mängel der Waffen geführt. Zum Teil erschienen die Waffen so als nicht völlig bedenkenfreie Alternative. Gleichzeitig wussten die TeilnehmerInnen, dass noch erhebliche Entwicklungsspielräume für technische Verbesserungen vorhanden waren, sodass diese Waffen und deren Funktion nie komplett infrage gestellt worden sind. Für die Konferenz 2011 wurde nun als erklärtes Ziel im offiziellen Programmtext angekündigt, sich auf die aggressive Verbreitung und Vermarktung von weniger-tödlichen Waffen zu konzentrieren. LLW-kritische Positionen und Diskussionen (die bisher schon unterrepräsentiert waren) sollen zugunsten dieser Ziele weichen [2]. Mit diesem Strategiewechsel steht zu befürchten, dass LLW schon bald auf breiter Fläche und in einer neuen Qualität eingesetzt werden könnten.
Inhaltlich rücken immer stärker die Einsätze gegen sogenannte wachsende neue Bedrohungen (Aufstandsbekämpfung, Kontrolle von Menschenmassen, sogenannte „friedensschaffende Militäreinsätze“) in den Fokus der Konferenz. Vor allem crowd-riot control-Maßnahmen ersetzen die „klassischen“ Szenarien Krieg und militärische Konflikte. Dies wiederum beeinflusst die technische Entwicklung von LLW, sodass diese Waffen immer deutlicher auch auf Aufstandsbekämpfung zugeschnitten werden.

Kritik und Positionierung:
Sowohl sogenannte „weniger-tödliche“ Waffen an sich, als auch informelle Zusammenschlüsse und Konferenzen, welche an der Öffentlichkeit vorbei agieren, sind unserer Meinung nach abzulehnen.
„Weniger tödliche“ Waffen stellen (genauso wie alle anderen Waffen) eine Form von militärischer bzw. staatlicher Unterdrückung dar, welche als Repression gegen Einzelne und Gruppen zum Ausdruck kommt. Sie haben einzig die Funktion, die herrschenden Machtverhältnisse zu erhalten und die Interessen der Mächtigen durchzusetzen. Diese Waffen stehen zentralen Werten wie Selbstbestimmung und Handlungsfreiheit entgegen. Sie ersetzen nicht tödliche Waffen, sondern ergänzen das bestehende Waffenarsenal. Deshalb sind sie nicht deeskalierend oder friedenschaffend einzuschätzen. Im Gegenteil verringern sie durch ihren „leichten“ und als unproblematisch propagierten Einsatz den Zeitraum der Kommunikation bzw. die Hemmschwelle Waffengewalt einzusetzen. Gerade der Einsatz gegen ZivilistInnen und friedlichen Menschenmengen kann durch „weniger-tödliche“ Waffen gerechtfertig werden.
Institutionelle Zusammenschlüsse und Konferenzen wie das „Europäische Symposium für Nicht-tödliche Waffen“ und die involvierten Organisationen dahinter stellen undemokratische, kaum zu kontrollierende Strukturen dar. Es findet eine massive Vernetzung und Interessenvertretung zwischen suprastaatlichen Organisationen, Staaten, Militärs, (universitärer) Forschung und der Rüstungsindustriewirtschaft hinsichtlich militärischer Verbreitung dieser Waffen statt. Die Gefahr, dass einseitige (sicherheitspolitische und rüstungsindustrienahe) Interessen bedient werden, scheint naheliegend. Das offene Bekenntnis zur Verbreitung von weniger-tödlichen Waffen im Programmtext der Konferenz 2011 bestärkt diesen Verdacht.
Diese potentielle Entwicklung betrifft auch und gerade die sozialen Bewegungen und radikalen linken Gruppen (bei Demonstrationen, Protestaktionen, zivilem Ungehorsam etc.). Vor dem Hintergrund sich weiter verschärfender sozialer Ungleichheiten, einem kollabierenden Finanzsystem, Umweltzerstörungen sowie ansteigender sozialer Konflikte werden schon gegenwärtig die Waffen und Abwehrsysteme entwickelt, welche zukünftig bei sozialen Auseinandersetzungen eingesetzt werden. Deshalb ist es sinnvoll, den Fokus gerade auch auf die Plattformen (in diesem Kontext die Konferenz und die EWG-NLW) zu richten, bei denen die Grundsteine für die Bewilligung solcher Waffen gelegt wird.

Marjorie Cohn – The assassination of Osama bin Laden has rekindled the discourse about the efficacy and legality of using torture in the “war on terror.” Torture is illegal under all circumstances, even in wartime. Moreover, the United States located Bin Laden with traditional interrogation methods over several years, not by the use of torture.

When the United States ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it became part of U.S. law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which says treaties are the supreme law of the land. The Torture Convention states, “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” The prohibition against torture is unequivocal, regardless of the circumstances.

Pundits proclaim that the successful hit on Bin Laden exonerates the Bush administration for its use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” – aka torture. John Yoo wrote in the Wall Street Journal that the kill “vindicates the Bush administration, whose intelligence architecture marked the path to bin Laden’s door.” The author of the most egregious torture memos, Yoo maintains that “the tough interrogations” of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libi provided the United States with the identity of Bin Laden’s courier.

Yoo’s claims are false. Senator John McCain declared in a speech on the Senate floor yesterday, “It was not torture, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees that got us the major leads that ultimately enabled our intelligence community to find Osama bin Laden.” McCain said that CIA Director Leon Panetta told him: “The first mention of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti – the nickname of the al-Qaeda courier who ultimately led us to bin Laden – as well as a description of him as an important member of al-Qaeda, came from a detainee held in another country, who we believe was not tortured. None of the three detainees who were waterboarded provided Abu Ahmed’s real name, his whereabouts or an accurate description of his role in al-Qaeda.”

McCain added, “In fact, the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ on Khalid Sheik Mohammed produced false and misleading information.” Mohammed was waterboarded 183 times in 2003. It is well-established in U.S. case law that waterboarding constitutes torture.

Tommy Vietor, spokesman for the National Security Council, agrees that waterboarding didn’t lead us to Bin Laden. He said, “The bottom line is this: If we had some kind of smoking-gun intelligence from waterboarding in 2003, we would have taken out Osama bin Laden in 2003.” He added: “It took years of collection and analysis from many different sources to develop the case that enabled us to identify this compound, and reach a judgment that Bin Laden was likely to be living there.”

White House Press Secretary Jay Carney concurs: “It simply strains credulity to suggest that a piece of information that may or may not have been gathered eight years ago somehow led to a successful mission [on May 1]. That’s just not the case.” Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, confirmed that “none of it came as a result of harsh interrogation practices.”

A 2006 study by the National Defense Intelligence College found that traditional, rapport-building interrogation techniques are extremely effective even with the most hardened detainees, but coercive tactics create resistance and resentment.

Interrogators agree that torture is not efficacious to glean intelligence. Glenn L. Carle, who supervised the 2002 interrogation of a high-level detainee for the CIA, told The New York Times that coercive techniques “didn’t provide useful, meaningful, trustworthy information.”

Likewise, Ali Soufan, who interrogated Abu Zubaydah, testified before Congress that harsh interrogation techniques “are ineffective, slow, and unreliable, and as a result harmful to our efforts to defeat al Qaeda.” Soufan wrote in the Times that any useful information Zubaydah provided happened before the “enhanced interrogation techniques” were utilized.

Matthew Alexander, a former senior military interrogator who supervised or conducted 1,300 interrogations in Iraq, which led to the capture of several al-Qaeda leaders, echoes Soufan’s sentiments. Alexander said, “I think that without a doubt, torture and enhanced interrogation techniques slowed down the hunt for Bin Laden.”

When I testified in 2008 before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties about Bush administration interrogation policy, one of the Republican congressmen asked me how I would fashion an interrogation statute. I replied that it would require humane, kind, respectful treatment to develop trust. As the questioner sniggered, Professor Philippe Sands, who also testified on the same panel that day, said I was correct, that the British got much better intelligence from the Irish Republican Army when they used humane techniques.

In her chapter in The United States and Torture: Interrogation, Incarceration, and Abuse, journalist Jane Mayer discusses Ibn Sheikh al Libi, who was tortured in CIA custody. Al Libi provided a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, which Colin Powell cited in his speech before the Security Council as he tried to secure a resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq. The CIA knew Al Libi’s information was false; indeed, he later recanted, and died under mysterious circumstances.

Torture is not simply illegal, immoral and ineffective. It is also counter-productive. Former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora testified before Congress that the two most effective recruiting tools for those who would do harm to our soldiers in Iraq were Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. When people see the U.S. government torturing detainees from their countries, they resent us even more.

Indeed, an interrogator currently serving in Afghanistan, told Forbes, “I cannot even count the amount of times that I personally have come face to face with detainees, who told me they were primarily motivated to do what they did, because of hearing that we committed torture . . . Torture committed by Americans in the past continues to kill Americans today.”

Until the United States completely revamps our foreign policy and ends the wars, occupations, and harsh treatment of people in U.S. custody, we will continue to be vulnerable to terrorism.

Marjorie Cohn is a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, president of the National Lawyers Guild, and the U.S. representative to the executive committee of the American Association of Jurists. Her new book: The United States and Torture: Interrogation, Incarceration, and Abuse.

Onlineredaktion – The UK military is carrying out a secret ground war in Libya as part of the NATO military alliances‘ scheme to prolong the occupation of the North African country.

Former members of Britain’s special forces, better known as SAS, and other western employees of private security companies are helping NATO in its reconnaissance operations in and around the Libyan city of Misrata, the dailyThe Guardian reported.

A senior British military source said the elite unit of former SAS troops, which is funded by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), represents Britain; this comes as Prime Minister David Cameron insists that no British boots are on the ground in Libya.

According to The Guardian, these former SAS troops are operating in Libya in close collaboration with Britain, France and other NATO countries, and have been supplied with the most modern communication equipments to pass details of the locations and movements of Colonel Gaddafi’s forces to the Naples headquarters of NATO in Italy.

The NATO command then verifies the targets by spy planes and US Predator drones and launches aerial attacks on them, the report said.

This is while that NATO warplanes and fighter jets have pounded the revolutionary forces‘ positions for several times so far and practically hampered their advance towards the capital Tripoli.

There have also been several reports of civilian deaths caused by NATO attacks, which have been confirmed by the revolutionaries.

Footage of 11 ex-SAS and Parachute Regiment troops in Libya was aired by Arab TV station al-Jazeera in Dafniya, which is the western-most point of the revolutionary lines west of Misrata.

Highly trained with front line experience round the world, they are the UK’s unofficial boots on the ground, which has been in the country for the past four weeks.

Their presence is an incredibly sensitive subject as the UN Security Council resolution in March authorising the use of force against Gaddafi specifically excludes “a foreign occupation force of any form on any Libyan territory.”

“These men definitely did not want to be seen by prying eyes as it could compromise their mission, which is very unofficial,” said the senior military source.

“But the fact is that they are representing Britain – whether it has been denied or not – and the British government has given the green light for this, via a circuitous route,” the source added.

“They are Brits and they are being paid for indirectly by the British taxpayer to a private company, whether the money was paid via a third or even fourth party,” said the source.

The ex-SAS troops – who are claimed to earn as much as £10,000 a month as third party “freelances” – were seen in action in Iraq, Afghanistan, Columbia and Northern Ireland. Their wages have been paid to the private firm indirectly from a British government fund.

The NATO military alliance is working on a plan to prolong the war in Libya in its bid to broaden its military occupation of the country, according to the report.

This is while the MoD has stressed that there are no combat troops on the ground in Libya, saying that the only MoD personnel in the country includes 10 military advisors and mentors in Benghazi.

William Hague, the foreign secretary, described the advisers as „experienced military officers“, and said they would advise the revolutionaries on intelligence gathering, logistics and communications.

These private soldiers are reported to be paid by Arab countries, notably Qatar, the report said.

The UN Security Council resolution No. 1973 has only authorised the western military alliance to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya to protect its civilians from being slaughtered at the hands of the country’s long-time dictator, stressing that no foreign boots should touch the Libyan soil.

But, it seems that the western alliance including Britain is resorting to private security firms in an attempt to get rid of the restrictions implied by the Security Council resolution.

The North African country is practically divided into two separate entities after western counties invaded it more than two months ago, something which had happened in Libya when it was a UK colony.

Mark Anderson – As the economy tanks, AMERICAN FREE PRESS prepares to cover Bilderberg 2011 in St. Moritz, Switzerland June 9-12. The average American, the average European and countless others are much more affected than ever before by the painful policies that come from the very people who comprise the notorious Bilderberg group.

For too many years, the American press has been unforgivably silent on this global planning group, whose secret meetings about important matters—always behind sealed doors, ringed with heavily armed guards—were first brought to light by the late columnist Westbrook Pegler in the early days and then given grand exposure by AFP’s own Willis A. Carto and Jim Tucker ever since.

Tucker helped bring the European press into the fold. While the U.S. corporate media remain silent, readers of papers around the world now know about these conspirators.

Never before have there been fewer excuses for the continual U.S. press blackout on the annual Bilderberg meetings. Television reports in mid-May did focus heavily on one infamous Bilderberg member, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who headed the International Monetary Fund. The IMF has saddled several nations with impossible debt structures, resulting in major news stories. Yet, Strauss-Kahn made even bigger headlines than the IMF with his alleged sexual crime that landed him in a jail in New York. Still, his obvious Bilderberg pedigree escapes America’s reporters, editors and publishers.

Remember David Rockefeller’s oft-quoted words during a 1991 Bilderberg meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany exactly 20 years ago: “We are grateful to The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time Magazine and other great publications whose directors have attended our meetings and respected their promises of discretion for almost 40 years. It would have been impossible for us to develop our plan … if we had been subjected to the lights of publicity during those years. But the world is now more sophisticated and prepared to march toward a world government. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries.”

The “national auto-determination” traditional to Switzerland is a major reason why a prominent Swiss legislator wrote a letter to a federal councilor in charge of police functions (see AFP’s May 23 issue, page 1), stressing that many Swiss do not want the likes of Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger and other undesirables breaking bread for global control within Swiss borders.

Bilderberg’s ongoing plan to make crude oil cost much more and strangle national economies with their debt schemes are finally being felt by everyone—up close and personal. That is why AFP, We Are Change/ Switzerland and others are sounding the alarm more loudly than ever.

Bilderberg-Conferences – An Insult to Democracy and Press Freedom
In drei Wochen: Bilderbergkonferenz in St. Moritz/Schweiz
Alle Jahre wieder die Bilderberg- Konferenz – oder: Verhöhnung von Demokratie und Öffentlichkeit
Hallo, ist das der Sonderzug nach Bilderberg? – Da muss ich hin

MR. BRYAN WHITMAN (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs): This is a traditional background briefing, no video or audio from out of here, no photographs please, no taping is permitted by video – by audio device for your note-taking is all. Okay? And, again, the briefer can be referred to and attributed as a senior intelligence official. With that, let’s go ahead and get started.

I’ll turn it over to you.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Thank you all for coming in on a Saturday and especially on Mother’s Day weekend. The operation on Sunday that resulted in the death of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was a culmination of years of intelligence collection and analysis focused on disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda.

The United States intelligence community salutes the assault team that courageously carried out a dangerous and imperative mission.

In the wake of this major counterterrorism success, the intelligence community remains squarely focused on the safety of the American people. We will sustain intense pressure on al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Al Qaeda is damaged by bin Laden’s death, but the group remains dangerous.

As a result of the raid, we’ve acquired the single largest collection of senior terrorist materials ever. We are currently reviewing materials retrieved from bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad. The materials have already provided us some important insights and we expect to learn more about al Qaeda and its affiliates, their plans and intentions, and any threats they currently pose.

If potential threat information is discovered, the United States government will take all necessary measures to protect the American people. The collection of bin Laden compound materials is large and is proving valuable. It will take time, therefore, to perform a thorough review. But we are already disseminating intelligence across the U.S. government based on what we found.

Today I’ll review key points on the confirmation of Osama bin Laden’s identity, describe the task force that has been set up to review the intelligence from bin Laden’s compound and share some of the information we have reviewed thus far. Further, I will distribute some of the video footage collected during the raid. It is highly unlikely that some of this material would have been in the possession of anyone other than Osama bin Laden.

I’ll start by briefly reviewing how we confirmed bin Laden’s identity. First, one of the women of the compound identified him to the assault team as Osama bin Laden. Second, using facial recognition methods, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] specialists compared photos of the body to known photos of bin Laden and were able to determine with 95 percent certainty that the body was his. This process relies on points of similarity of unique facial features, including the shape and size of an individual’s eyes, ears, and nose.

Third, DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] analysis conducted separately by Department of Defense and CIA labs has positively identified Osama bin Laden. DNA samples collected from his body were compared to a comprehensive DNA profile derived from bin Laden’s large extended family. Based on that analysis, the DNA is unquestionably his. The possibility of a mistaken identity on the basis of this analysis is approximately one in 11.8 quadrillion. (Laughter.) I’ll let you count the zeroes. (Laughter.)

Fourth, from our initial review of the materials, we assessed that much of this information, including personal correspondence between Osama bin Laden and others, as well as some of the video footage you will see today, would only have been in his possession.

Finally, al Qaeda released its own statement yesterday acknowledging the death of bin Laden. We expected that al Qaeda would issue a statement after his death, but it is noteworthy that the group did not announce a new leader, suggesting it is still trying to deal with bin Laden’s demise.

It’s also noteworthy that they acknowledged his death came in Pakistan. In the past, they have tried to obscure the reality of their presence in that country.

The intelligence community is in the initial stages of exploiting materials that the assault team recovered from the compound. Identifying any imminent threats and plotting is, of course, our top priority.

A multiagency task force led by the CIA has been established to triage, catalogue, and analyze this intelligence. The task force is working around the clock and will draw on the expertise of – and you need to be ready for some acronyms here – the CIA, DHS [Department of Homeland Security], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], the National Media Exploitation Center, NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center], NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency], NSA [National Security Agency], and Treasury.

This collection represents the most significant amount of intelligence ever collected from a senior terrorist. It includes digital, audio and video files of varying sizes, printed materials, computer equipment, recording devices and handwritten documents.

The following is a key point: the materials reviewed over the past several days clearly show that bin Laden remained an active leader in al Qaeda, providing strategic, operational and tactical instructions to the group. Though separated from many al Qaeda members who are located in more remote areas of the region, he was far from a figurehead. He was an active player making the recent operation even more essential for our nation’s security.

The materials reviewed thus far reveal that bin Laden continued to direct even tactical details of the group’s management and to encourage plotting. The materials show that bin Laden remained focused on inspiring and engineering international terrorism and specifically on attacking the United States. In fact, one previously unreleased video, which we will show momentarily, is a self-styled message to the United States.

Today and in the future, we won’t necessarily be able to provide regular updates on what this operation yielded. As you can understand, much of what we find will remain classified. The war against al Qaeda and its affiliates continues.

I will quickly walk through details from five of the video clips found among the materials at bin Laden’s compound. Because it would be inappropriate to spread the words of terrorists and the propaganda messages, especially Osama bin Laden’s, we’ve removed audio from the footage you’re about to see. The footage has not been altered in any other way. We are releasing this footage to underscore two main points: first, the videos make clear that bin Laden remained active in al Qaeda’s terrorist propaganda operations, especially in shaping his own image; second, as I noted earlier, it is highly unlikely that some of this footage would have resided anywhere else but with bin Laden.

(The 1st video is playing.)

The first video is a complete yet unreleased bin Laden video. He calls it “A Message to the American People” and we believe it was produced sometime between October 9th and November 5th, 2010. We don’t know why the video hasn’t yet appeared.

In this video, you can see that his beard has been dyed black. In this message he repeats his usual themes by condemning U.S. policy and denigrating capitalism.

Let’s go ahead and stop that one and go to the second, please.

Q: There’s a date in there?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I don’t have a date on that. Oh, I’m sorry. Yes. Between October 9th and November 5th, 2010. Yes.

(The 2nd video is playing.)

The second video clip shows him watching his own images on television. Pardon the long lead time, but we’re going to show this is in its entirety. About a minute or a minute and a half, and we don’t have the exact time on it, is focused squarely on the television.

Q: What’s on the screen? Is that various channels?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: It appears to be various channels but it’s unclear if this is –

(Cross talk.)

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Right. It’s different channels, right, but we’re – yes.

Q: It – (inaudible) – he’s getting different channels –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We’re unclear if this is live or taped.

Q: Is there a date out there?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Well, you’ll see in a minute that he flips through the various channels but it’s unclear if this is live or taped. Yes.

Q: Is there a date on this?

Q: Do we believe this is from inside the compound where he was taken? Was it just taken from inside the compound or some other location?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We’re looking into that right now. Okay? But it’s unclear – again, I would reiterate that it’s improbable that this kind of footage would be anywhere but with bin Laden. He jealously guarded his image.

Q: Was this at the compound?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Just a second. You can see that in this video bin Laden has not colored or trimmed his beard, suggesting that this practice is one he reserved for films he planned to distribute. You can also see him gesturing to the person recording him to focus on the image on television of bin Laden firing a rifle. Because we can’t say at this time if the footage he’s watching is taped or live, we can’t determine the date of this video.

Q: That’s him with Zawahiri in the video?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yes, that was him on screen with Zawahiri.

Q: Did you know, if he’s watching TV or a video, a DVD?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not sure if it’s taped or live – it’s still early.

Q: Do we know which room it is?

Q: Do you know which room in the house this is?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Again, we’re going through the analysis right now.

Q: Do we know if it’s in the compound?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We’re working through that.

Q: You don’t know.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Right. At this point we’re still discussing where this footage was taken. But, again, I would reiterate, it’s unlikely that this kind of candid footage of Osama bin Laden would be anywhere else than with him.

Q: (Briefer name deleted), if he’s actively changing channels, that indicates that’s a live satellite box. You can’t change channels on a recorded DVD.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We haven’t reached a final assessment yet, Kim.

Q: Was his beard grey at the time that he was shot? Can you tell us that? Is this fairly contemporary in other words?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: His beard was grey.

Q: Okay.

Q: Was there audio on this one and you guys cut it out of this one too?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: There was audio on this.

(Cross talk.)

Q: Are you able to describe what is on the audio, if not – if you’re not able to give us the words to the propaganda video, is he saying to the guy –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I don’t have that available.

Q: You don’t. And can I also ask you – I mean, I noticed that he is moving his left arm. And did you not – maybe I don’t remember accurately but did you not think at some point that he had suffered serious injuries and was unable to move his left arm? Do I remember that wrong?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I mean, I’ve seen the speculation about that. I can’t confirm that from the video.

Q: Was any of that equipment recovered by the U.S. during the raid?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: All of this material here seen today was collected during the raid.

Q: Including the television and the satellite box?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Oh, I’m sorry. My apologies. My apologies. I don’t have that information in fact.

Q: Okay.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: All right.

Q: Is at the beginning – (inaudible) – was from – you can’t say that – (inaudible)?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We’re still going through the analysis of where this actually – the footage was taken.

MR. WHITMAN: So let’s go on with that – (inaudible) – we’ll get the questions then.

(The 3rd video is playing.)

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Let’s go on to the next video. Yes. Okay. Our last three video clips are short and show rehearsal sessions by the al Qaeda leader. Some are clearly outtakes. The first video shows bin Laden practicing in front of an armoire.

Q: His beard is dyed here – (off mic)?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We believe his beard is dyed.

Q: Do you have a date on this one?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: No date on that one. The next video clip shows the beginning of a video session where either he or the filmmaker missed the cue and fumbled the lighting.

(The 4th video is playing.)

Q: In the last one did he mess up on his Arabic?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not sure what the –

Q: Were these videos shot in the compound? Is the backdrop the same – was in the recording?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Our preliminary analysis suggests that the armoire is an armoire that matches one at the compound. Preliminary analysis.

Q: Clip three?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: First clip. Or, excuse me.

Q: There’s a different background in the second.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: The armoire clip.

Q: The third clip?

Q: Yes. The first of the three short ones.

Q: Yes. Okay.

Q: But the fourth one you’re not sure where that was?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m sorry? The fourth –

Q: The fourth clip didn’t have an armoire so we don’t know where that one was taken?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Right. The missed cue. The missed cue. Yes. There’s no armoire in that background.

Q: (Off mic.)

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Right. We’re still assessing that one.

(The 5th video is playing.)

And the third clip (5th video) shows an outtake from a practice session in front of a wrinkled sheet. That was probably used as a temporary backdrop.

Q: And no clues to the times that those were shot.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We do not know the dates of these clips we just showed you. As Bryan mentioned, the video files are on DVD. They will be provided at the end of the background briefing. I think there’s enough for one per person.

Q: Is that the extent of the clips that will be provided on the DVD, just those five?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Today. They’re yours to use as you like. Just please source them to the U.S. government. Finally, we will hand out with the DVDs an on-the-record comment from Leon Panetta, director of the CIA. And with that, I will open it up to questions.

Kim.

Q: (Inaudible) – a few questions. Has any of the data so far produced actionable intelligence that’s led to targeting in the past week? And what has it told you about Osama bin Laden’s daily life in the compound, the number of kids? Did you put together of kids with some of this to brings us a picture?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: On actionable intelligence I’m not going to comment on that. The important thing, our top priority is of course to identify any threat information and to disseminate that threat information widely within the U.S. government and, as appropriate, with our foreign partners. Of course, another top priority is to exploit the information to attract leads to other members of al Qaeda. But I’m not going to comment on actionable intelligence.

Q: Daily life.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Daily life – we’re still putting together based on this package a sense of what life might have been like, but I don’t have anything firm to characterize that at this time.

Q: (Briefer name deleted), since the al Qaeda statement confirming bin Laden’s death did not include an announcement about who his successor would be, what does that say about the position of the long-known number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Ayman al-Zawahiri is obviously the presumed successor, but there are strong indications that he is not popular within certain circles of the group. So I believe it’s an open question as to who will take over for Osama bin Laden. It is, of course, anathema to al Qaeda to hold free and fair elections. (Laughter.) But if free and fair elections were held, Zawahiri most likely would have a fight on his hands.

Q: If I could follow up. Since you already know that he’s not popular among certain groups, do you know who is emerging as a possible leader among them?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I wouldn’t want to speculate at this time, Mik. I mean, there are a number of senior al Qaeda officials who could in theory step up. But I wouldn’t want to speculate.

Q: Including al-Awlaki?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I think – you know, there are senior terrorist leaders across the al Qaeda organization and its affiliates who could step up. But, again, it would be speculation.

Yes. Spencer.

Q: How often do you have any indication from material you captured about bin Laden being personally in contact with al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen or any other affiliates outside of Pakistan?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not going to comment on that today, but suffice it to say the treasure trove of information has provided some golden nuggets of information on communications within the al Qaeda group. And, you know, we hope to get a better sense as exploitation continues.

(A Pentagon fire alarm test occurs with the ringing of a bell over public address system for the entire building for less than 30 seconds.)

Is that the gong?

Q: It’s the lunch bell.

MR. WHITMAN: For those of you who don’t work here regularly, on Saturday this is when we test our fire alarms. (Laughter.)

Q: We’re not done.

MR. WHITMAN: And with that – (laughter) – back to my kids.

Q: Are you old enough to remember the gong show?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yes. I am in fact. (Laughter.) Should we wait until –

MR. WHITMAN: It could go on a while. He finishes this thing then in another 10 minutes or so we’ll get more dings but we’ll just have time –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m used to dings. Okay. I’m sorry. Let’s start over here then we’ll –

Q: Why did you decide to release these particular ones? How much in terms of time – you know, this is X number of minutes out of – what estimate can you give us so how much video you’ve got – you’ve retrieved if you know yet? And why did you release these particular segments?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We are still cataloguing the material. It is a large collection. You know, I can’t give a precise quantity of the collection itself and I can’t tell you how many videos like this are contained within the materials. The one thing that in addition to the threat information that we’re focused on from kind of analytical perspective, as we understand that some of this material at the end of the day – you know, there’s quantity and then there’s quality. And we want to make sure that we methodically process this material so that we get the highest quality intelligence from this collection. Yes, sir.

Q: Could you give a couple of examples – when you say he was in control or attempting to assert control of the organization, can you expand on that a little bit, give us an idea of how he was doing that aside from the volume of information that you recovered?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: It’s hard to get specific because, obviously, we’re still fighting al Qaeda. But suffice it to say, this compound in Abbottabad was an active command-and-control center for al Qaeda’s top leader. And it’s clear, as I said in the remarks, that he was not just a strategic thinker for the group. He was active in operational planning and in driving tactical decisions inside al Qaeda.

Barbara.

Q: Two questions: how surprised were you to find out that he was engaged in operational and tactical planning? Was that a surprise? And can you tell us any more of the video of the message to the American people that you put up – even if you can’t show us the audio, was he specifically making threats or in any of this material, were there threats against the United States?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Can you repeat the first question, Barbara?

Q: About the surprise on – were you surprised to find about – because you –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States and is responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocents. It was entirely unsurprising to us and it was always our working assumption that he was involved in aspects of al Qaeda’s operational planning.

Q: And anything more, because you mentioned that it was a message to the American people. I think people are going to be very much wanting to know what was he saying. Can you describe it in any way?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Right. He rehashed many of the themes he’s talked about before, criticizing the United States and, as I said before, denigrating capitalism. We’re obviously reviewing these and other materials, other videos to see if there’s any threat information contained within them. I’m unaware personally that this particular video contains any specific or direct threat information but we’re obviously continuing to analyze that video.

Catherine.

Q: Does the evidence continue to support the idea that he was obsessed with mass casualty attacks and also mass transit and planes? And is there evidence that there really had been a shift in ’06 to the recruitment of Americans?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yes. I’m not going to be able to characterize the ‘06 scenario, Catherine, but I will tell you that in the materials we’ve seen thus far, he appeared to show continuing interest in transportation and infrastructure targets.

Eli.

Q: Can you talk about any evidence of contacts between Osama bin Laden and Pakistani government officials or other government officials from other Middle Eastern countries, and also members of the bin Laden family? Were there any contacts between bin Laden and the bin Laden family that you found and can talk about that?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I can’t get into the details yet but at this point we have no indication that the Pakistani government was aware that bin Laden was at this compound in Abbottabad. We’re asking some questions and the Pakistanis themselves have said that they’re asking questions of themselves.

The relationship with Pakistan is an important one. It’s also a complicated relationship and it’s important that we find ways in the future to work together, especially on the counterterrorism front. I will note that they have been cooperative in the past on pursuing terrorists inside Pakistan. This is a common fight. Bin Laden is responsible for supporting operations that have killed scores of Pakistanis as well, so there’s a mutual interest in us working together. And we need to find ways to solidify that relationship going forward.

Q: Can you say, though, whether there was evidence –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: One follow-up, and then –

Q: – Pakistan – Pakistani officials contact with bin Laden? Can you say whether you’ve found evidence of that?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I am unaware at this point of any Pakistani government knowledge of bin Laden’s whereabouts in Abbottabad.

Q: Not just Pakistani government – anybody from Pakistan?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: There – you know, I think another senior U.S. official said earlier this week that there may have been support from within Pakistan, but, you know, that doesn’t necessarily mean the Pakistani government. Okay? So we need to tread carefully here and analyze the information and to see where it takes us. I understand the questions that are being raised and they’re good ones, but again I will repeat at this point I don’t have any indication that the Pakistani government was aware.

Adam.

Q: Does government – wait a minute. Does government include ISI and military?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Pakistani government. Yep.

Adam?

Q: When you say that video was called “Message to America” or “Message to the American People,” is that what it said in Arabic? Is that what you were translating, or is that what you guys are calling it? And also, is there a quote that you can give us from it? I know you explained what’s in it, but is there a quote that you can provide us from that video?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yeah, I am not an Arabic linguist, to be certain.

Q: (Inaudible.)

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: All right, okay. But, you know, I don’t have that. And in terms of excerpts or transcripts from these videos it is not our intention to release them, as I said. We’re not in the business of spreading the word of al Qaeda and its propaganda.

Yes?

Q: (Inaudible) – video, was it actually saying “Message to the American People”?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: That I don’t know. We need to get the exact translation.

Q: Could we get a translation of that?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We will attempt to, and I’m sure that some of you know some folks who speak Arabic, okay. All right.

Yes, on the corner?

Q: Elisabeth Bumiller from the New York Times.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Elisabeth, how are you?

Q: Just fine. I just wanted to talk logistically. You say he was very much in command and control of this command and control center. Can you just talk practically how he did that without internet and without phone lines? Apparently he used thumb drives to communicate back and forth. Are you –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not going to get into specifics, but, you know, it’s been thought for some time, of course, that he would rely heavily on a courier network. That’s precisely what led us to the compound. So it is probable that the couriers at the compound were supporting his communications with other members of al Qaeda.

Q: (Briefer name deleted), can you say what were the – the frequency with which that was happening at this command and control center? How often were messages showing up?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Something we’re obviously looking at, Greg, but I don’t – I can’t characterize frequency at this point.

Mike?

Q: Two questions. One, can you elaborate at all on Zawahiri’s unpopularity within al Qaeda, which you mentioned before? What is it that his fellow al Qaeda members don’t like about him?

And secondly, when you talk about bin Laden as running this as a command and control center, can you give any examples of disrupted plots where you could see bin Laden’s direction involved?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m going to have to defer on that. I think we need to analyze the intelligence. I wouldn’t get into that. But on Zawahiri, you know, he – to some members of al Qaeda – is extremely controlling, is a micromanager, and is not especially charismatic.

(Laughter.)

Q: (inaudible) – audio tape of the video of him watching himself, can you tell why he was – what he was saying or why he was watching himself on TV? Is there anything you can glean from that?

Also, of the cell phones that he – that you have, was one of them presumed to be his and were there international calls on that phone?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yeah, I’m not going to be able to get into that. We’re analyzing these videos right now and haven’t reached any firm conclusions, Jennifer. And in terms of cell phones, I’m just not going to go there.

Yes, in the corner. Yes, sir.

Q: Hi, Kevin Baron, Stars and Stripes. You mentioned targets against infrastructure and things. Were there any targets against U.S troops or the war effort itself? I mean, has there been any – can you characterize any kind of – any kind of backlash or retribution since this raid has happened aimed at the war in Afghanistan.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: That’s a good question, something we’re obviously taking a close look at. And I don’t have, you know, a final answer for you on that, but we are reviewing this information closely for threats to the United States and to our interests, to include American troops.

Obviously al Qaeda has American blood on its hands, and that includes American blood in Afghanistan, and we’re going to, you know, on an around the clock basis mine this information for anything that could suggest that there are continuing threats from bin Laden and his inner circle against our troops.

Yes?

Q: (Inaudible.)

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q: Mike Evans from the Times.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Hello, Mike. How are you?

Q: Hi, (briefer name deleted). Can I just ask, you mentioned about the various measures you used for positive identification of Osama.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q: In the 40 minutes that your guys had there – the SEALs had there, did you have any time before he was actually shot that gave you time to tactically interrogate him or to take a blood sample from him while he was still alive or to photograph his eyes while he was still alive? And was the woman who provided the information that it was Osama bin Laden the woman who was shot in the leg?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not going to get into the specifics of what happened inside the compound that night. This briefing is focused on the intelligence aspects of the operation, but, you know, the assault team, you know, certainly engaged in a hostile environment. This is an al Qaeda compound. And I’ll leave it there.

Bill?

Q: (Briefer name deleted), the information you gained has probably triggered some kind of movement of al Qaeda people around the world. Are you seeing people on the move and can we expect to see any other take-downs in the near future?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: That’d be pure speculation on my part, and I wouldn’t want to get into movements of al Qaeda at this point.

Yes?

Q: (Briefer name deleted), have you asked the ISI – has the U.S. government asked the ISI for names of operatives to compare with names that are seized on this material?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not going to get into discussions with the Pakistanis.

Q: (Inaudible) – hear the audio. Is it different – are these videos different in terms of showing bin Laden’s energy level compared to videos that we’ve seen before?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Oh, gosh. I don’t know how to – I don’t know how to characterize –

(Cross talk.)

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’ll leave that to you. And I’m not going to characterize the sound. Again, I’m not going to comment on any audio related to these tapes.

Yes, sir?

Q: Can you give us either numbers or at least a better sense of how much material you got – how many thumb drives, discs, computers, whatever you can share?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: There’s actually so much material that we’re still trying to accurately quantify it.

Yes.

(Cross talk.)

Q: Is it fair to say hundreds of items?

Q: Is there anything in the material you found that indicates that he still had his fascination with attacking New York and New York City?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yeah, I’m not going to get into specific cities or whatnot, but let me just reiterate that what we’ve found so far, he continued to, you know, be strongly interested in plotting attacks against the U.S. homeland.

Yes?

Q: (Inaudible) – the fact that he dyed his beard, what does that say about his vanity or what do you – or what he thought about his public image?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Well, I won’t comment specifically on dying the beard, but this is clearly an al Qaeda leader who was very interested in his own image. And he took very seriously and engaged very heavily in al Qaeda propaganda operations, so, you know, we’ll have to do some more analysis on that, but our take-away is that he jealously guarded his image.

Yes, sir?

Q: Is there – you talk about planning. I think he liked to be into the details. Were there – are there specific things – did he have drawings and plans where he was planning to tell people to do certain things? And off the remote one where he was watching the video, are there other videos that are kind of the Obama’s – Osama’s way of life in a compound? Are there other things you haven’t shown us that show him doing things in the compound?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We’re going to review the materials and, you know, we’ll be looking for that kind of thing. I’m not in a position to comment on those at this time.

(Cross talk.)

Q: (Inaudible) – about electronic tripwires within the video and audio materials that could cause them to erase or – I mean, are they advanced enough for that or is that something that –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: You know, I’m not in a position to characterize the security of the videos, but I will say that the U.S. government has excellent technical experts who can exploit this material.

Yes, in the back.

Q: Have the Pakistanis talked to you about questioning the – those noncombatants that were there in the compound? At least trying to get access.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not going to talk about discussions with the Pakistanis, but we obviously have some questions.

Yes?

Q: I have a question about you mentioned the command and control aspect. Is there any indication from what you’ve seen so far that they had a backup for a command and control center if this one in – in this location was compromised in some way that there was a new location that they had picked out?

And also, do you have an estimate in terms of how long the multi-agency task force is going to take to go through this information? Are you planning weeks, months?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: It’s going to take some time. I don’t have an accurate timeline for you and I am unaware of an alternate location for a bin Laden command and control center, but that’s obviously something we’re looking for.

Yes, Rachel?

Q: Can you talk a little more about the courier network? Obviously picking out two of these particular couriers so close to him must have had some kind of operational impact down the network. Can you talk about the impact of that and is the courier network still a focal point? What else have you gleaned from this particular cache of intel?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not going to comment on specifics. We’re obviously interested in any al Qaeda facilitator, to include couriers.

Yes?

Q: What makes it obvious that it was command and control?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: It’s hard for me to describe precisely given the sensitive nature of the intelligence we gleaned, but what we’ve gone through thus far shows that – again, that he was actively involved in plotting operations and in directing the daily operations of the group. He was not simply someone who was penning al Qaeda strategy. He was throwing operational ideas out there and he was also specifically directing other al Qaeda members. Okay?

Yes, who hasn’t asked a question yet? Yes, sir.

Q: Have you found any evidence of linked with al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits in the region like Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We’re obviously looking closely for those links. I’m not in a position to say at this time.

Q: And have you also shared any information with India? A moment ago you said you are sharing information with foreign countries. Any information that you have shared with the Indian government so far?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We have shared information with foreign countries, but I’m not going to say which ones.

Q: Was there any medical equipment like a dialysis machine or anything –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m not going to get into the specifics.

Q: Were there any links to banks?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: We’re obviously looking at al Qaeda financing as an important factor and we’re obviously looking for any insight into how al Qaeda funds its operations.

Yes, Chris?

MR. WHITMAN: As we were trying to – (inaudible) – no reason to get into a frenzy here, but as you know we’re getting to the point where our senior intelligence official is saying that that’s information that’s going to have to come from further assessment and things that we’re not going to be commenting on, so in the last couple of minutes here let’s see if we can’t get to a few of those people who haven’t had an opportunity to ask a question, but we’re going to take maybe four or five more and then bring it to a close, okay?

Q: (Inaudible) – we used to hear that he was sick and getting some doctors to treat him with dialysis and kidney problems and all that. Was it propaganda or do you still believe that somebody was hiding some information about him or it was true? And finally, if Raymond Davis case when it went through there these couple of weeks, did it help or hurt or this operation was underway even during Raymond Davis case?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I’m sorry, the last part?

Q: The Raymond Davis case.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yes, I’m familiar with that one.

Q: If this operation was still underway, or it – all this happened after Raymond Davis case.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: The intelligence case that led us to this compound, you know, started forming last summer around August, okay?

Q: (Inaudible) – illness?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Yeah, I’m not going to get into those – that speculation. You know, obviously it’s something of interest, but then again our top priority is any threat information and secondly leads to other al Qaeda terrorists. You know, the secondary questions will come later.

Q: Do you still – finally, do you still believe really – (inaudible) – that up until last days of death he was running his al Qaeda mission and nobody in the Pakistani government knew because he was delivering messages and all these messengers and all that?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I think I’ve said what I’ve said on Pakistan.

Chris?

Q: For years it was said that bin Laden was hiding in the tribal regions of Pakistan or Afghanistan and that, you know, A.Q. core wasn’t necessarily operational – that it had been denigrated. So – I mean, how is this not somewhat of an intelligence failure that, you know, you find out that bin Laden was operational and was command and control?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: If anyone defines this as an intelligence failure, I’ll be happy to have that argument. This is the greatest intelligence success perhaps of a generation. This is a hunt for a top al Qaeda leader that has spanned nearly 10 years. And this government, our intelligence community, and counterterrorism agencies have expended relentless effort to pursue leads on Osama bin Laden. This has always been a top priority. And this is a classic and historic intelligence success.

Intelligence cases aren’t built overnight. And it took a great deal of precision work, and persistence and perseverance on the part of collectors and analysts over many years to piece together the intelligence case that led to the raid. This was a circumstantial case up until the very end – a very strong one. But the intelligence picture didn’t become clear, obviously, until last Sunday.

Yes?

Q: Can you tell us what the overall impact has been on al Qaeda? Are they knocked back on their heels? Are they in disarray? What has been the read so far?

Q: And is Awlaki a possible successor as part of that?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I think we addressed Awlaki before, but –

(Cross talk.)

Q: — to bin Laden? Is that shown in the records?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I can’t say specifically at this point whether that’s in the records, per se, or in the documents, but, you know, it would be highly unsurprising if bin Laden didn’t know about Anwar al-Awlaki.

Q: Right, but back to the overall impact, are they really set back on their heels? Are they in disarray? What’s the take so far?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: They’ve been on their heels for some time, Mik. I mean, they’ve suffered extensive damage, and the fact that bin Laden is off the streets only exacerbates that damage for them, and that’s good for the United States and our allies.

Q: So can al Qaeda – (Briefer name deleted), can al Qaeda survive?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: I guess we’ll go to maybe two or three more questions. Yes, in the back. Yes?

Q: Did you – (inaudible) – the materials from the compound which you – only you, the people were left in the compound. Is it a choice – a technical choice? I mean, what happened in the immediate aftermath of the raid to all those people who still alive in the compound?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Repeat that, sir. I’m sorry.

Q: I’m sorry. You choose to pick up all the technical materials that was n the compound for intelligence purposes, but you left all the people who were still alive in the compound. You didn’t want to bring people with you to interrogate them. Why? Is it a technical choice?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: There was one objective for this mission and it was to find Osama bin Laden. And if that – and if he wasn’t there to get out.

(Cross talk.)

MR. WHITMAN: Come on, guys. Come on. Everybody settle down. We’re going to take one more question. It needs to be a question that really can help all of you in this room. (Laughter.) Some insight that hasn’t been asked yet and not just kind of another way of asking the same question that our senior defense official – our senior intelligence official has either answered or declined to answer. Who has that probing, final question.

Q: We all do.

MR. WHITMAN: All right, so we’re going to do two. We’re going to – we’re going to do Bill and we’re going to do Barbara and close down.

Q: You’ve said frequently that al Qaeda was trying to get weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. government has said that. Is there any indication from what you found that al Qaeda was pursuing nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological –

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: That’s obviously a top priority as we exploit these materials. You know, I don’t have anything on that to report today, but we’re focused squarely on that because obviously that would fall squarely into the threat category.

Barbara?

Q: My probing and insightful question –

MR. WHITMAN: It has to be good because you’ve got the last one.

Q: It might be. With respect, why do you have someone in this room taking photographs of us – this lady over here in black. Why was she standing up taking pictures of us?

MR. WHITMAN: That was your question? Those photographs are for the agency and for the official. They’re not public records, so don’t worry about that. So we won’t let that be the last question since it wasn’t real probing, but we will –

(Cross talk.)

MR. WHITMAN: You didn’t get a question in? You got a question in. Let’s go.

Q: Did you glean anything about the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban and did you find any American contacts in those phones?

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: It’s a good question and one that we’re trying to seek answers on one way or the other.

MR. WHITMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I want to think you again. No. I want to thank you again for showing up today.

SR. INTEL OFFICIAL: Thank you. I appreciate it.

[At the conclusion of the briefing, DVDs with the five video segments were handed out to the press corps along with the following ON THE RECORD statement from Leon E. Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency:

“This mission goes to the heart of what the CIA is all about: protecting America and building a better world for our children. It demonstrates the perseverance, skill, and sheer courage of the men and women who stand watch for our nation, day in and day out. And it is a model of seamless collaboration, both within the Intelligence Community and with the US military. The material found in the compound only further confirms how important it was to go after Bin Laden. Since 9/11, this is what the American people have expected of us. In this critical operation, we delivered“